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ORDER AND CHAOS: THE ROLE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN FOREIGN
POLICY
Alfred P. Rubin*

POINTS OF CHOICE. By Roger Fisher. Oxford, England: Oxford
University Press. 1978. Pp. vi, 89. £ 1.95; $5.95.
Points of Choice is the fifth and last of a series of monographs growing out of a study undertaken by the American
Society of International Law on the role of international law in
government decisions. Using the material of the previous monographs, which analyzed in some detail the use (and non-use) of
the tools of international law by the statesmen involved in the
Cyprus situation of 1958-1967, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962,
the Suez crisis of 1956, and the United Nations operation in the
Congo during 1960-1964, and using some original examples as
well, Professor Roger Fisher of the Harvard Law School argues
strongly that a fuller appreciation by statesmen of. the power of
international law to promote national goals, including the goal
of a more stable international political environment, would be
effective and to the benefit of us all. His argument is temperate,
well documented, simply stated with lively examples, and should
be overwhelmingly persuasive even to those whose conception
of the international legal order is as primitive as they so often,
and so wrongly, claim that order to be. He proposes two major
practical recommendations: that attention to international legal
implications should be built into the organization through which
the United States government formulates foreign policy goals and
tactics, and that the delicate tools of international law should be
used realistically, with an eye to their limits as well as their
strengths. On that level of generality, no one can seriously quarrel
with his conclusions.
On another level, Professor Fisher's conclusions are very
much open to question. He amply documents instances in which
America has failed to use the tools of international law to improve
a negotiating position or a tactical political situation. He shows
unmistakably that these failures are not the result of simple bureaucratic mismanagement or policy-makers' questionable evalu* Professor of International Law, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. B.A. 1952,
J.D. 1957, Columbia University; M. Litt. 1963, University of Cambridge.-Ed.
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ations of conflicting advice and nicely balanced interests. They
are the result of what frequently seems to be a disregard of legal
factors in decision-making. Such disregard directly affects American decisions that determine the immediate relations of the
United States with all other states, and, somewhat less directly,
it affects American tax rates, standards of living, and possibly
even war and peace. It has more subtle effects too. On the most
practical level, our foreign friends in their economic and political
planning must calculate the reliability of the United States as a
supplier of a stable currency in international exchange, an administrator of a regime of passage through the Panama Canal, a
partner in a defense treaty, a spokesman for human rights, including rights of property, and in many other roles. The extent
of that reliability is normally conceived to be reflected in formulations of law; not only the law of treaties, but in canons of construction found in international law just as canons of contract
construction are found in national commercial law; not only in
express promises to which the international legal order gives legal
effect as treaties, but in a web of binding relationships giving
stability to all international affairs and defining the distribution
of legal powers to change those commitments in step with changing times and needs. On the record presented by Professor Fisher,
the index of American reliability must be very low indeed. As a
result, the world must be less safe for the investment of property
and lives than it need be, and our share in what safety exists must
diminish. Serious problems like this require serious remedies.·
Professor Fisher's description of the problem and his proposed remedies do not seem to be serious. Throughout the book
the language of games appears: "The international order, legal
and political, is a game in which the rules and institutions are
constantly being revised as the game is played" (p. 39); "If all the
other players are respecting the rules of the game, if the game is
fair, and if not too much is involved in any one hand, a strong
case can be made for reconciling the pursuit of victory with the
pursuit of peace . . . " (p. 78). "Games Theory" is useful. But
carried to this extreme the game analogy, in my opinion, becomes
part of the problem. It degrades the discussion by trivializing it.
Real lives are involved, real standards of living, real (in some
cases religious) convictions, and, however sporting the pursuit of
peace and advantage may seem to some, it is not by any stretch
of the imagination a game to others. It is amusing to refer to the
interest of any "player" in winning each encounter, but in not
winning all encounters, a witticism repeated in various forms at
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least three times {pp. 61, 79, and 83) and which has a good deal
of validity within the context of the American Department of
Justice trying antitrust cases or state governments trying accused
individuals; but it is hard to see how it applies in the international arena where, as Professor Fisher points out, the issue is
normally not whether one "wins" but how to keep the system
("game"?) going in terms acceptable to all. The entire concept
of winning games or encounters seems inconsistent with a serious
approach to questions of life and death and the terms of survival.
This trivializing approach is in fact the root of the problem.
All who have thought the matter through, with or without the aid
of Professor Fisher's book and the well-documented, indeed magisterial, studies it rests on (one of the authors was himself Legal
Adviser to the Department of State during the crisis he analyzes;
all have had substantial experience in the government and a
learned and experienced panel of commentators to help polish
their monographs), agree that a state's perceptive use of the tools
of international law markedly improves its chances of achieving
both short- and long-term goals in the international arena. While
President Nasser's reliance on the tools of international law did
not assure the success of his policy to take over control of the
operation of the Suez Canal, it certainly improved his position;
while President Kennedy's reliance on the forms of international
law, including the treaty-based inter-American system, did not
itself ensure the basically favorable resolution of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, it certainly influenced politics and tactics in
ways favorable to American interests. These successes are not
trivial. Nor are the failures that result from ignoring the international system. Many are cited in the book, and many suggestions
are made as to how they could have been better handled. (To
those who know Professor Fisher, it is clear that his suggestions
are not mere hindsight, but the publication of ideas that he has
expressed often before, frequently contemporaneously with the
events he mentions.) The failures to achieve the practical results
that would have been achievable through a knowledgeable application of legal argument and the use of tactics geared to the
niceties of the legal order result in compromises that do not reflect the full range of pertinent relationships among states. Thus
the results are imbalanced even when on the surface more favorable to the United States than would likely have resulted from a
fuller appreciation of the weaknesses of our legal position. Such
imbalances are reflected in longer range instability growing out
of resentments and evasions by the states and individuals who
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feel their rights have been overborne. The instability is even more
obvious when the failure to use the tools of the law results in a
compromise on the surface less favorable to the United States
than a fuller appreciation of the strengths of our legal position
might have achieved. Worse yet, a display of legal ignorance, no
matter what the immediate result or lack ofresult at the negotiating table, degrades the United States in many unquantifiable
ways. It leads directly to the loss of prestige and of the capacity
to influence future events (which Professor Fisher ·calls "power"
for purposes of his monograph (p. 11)). Thus, the patent erosion
of American capacity to influence events can be laid in part to
failures to take seriously the tools that statesmen have at hand
when pursuing national policy. These are losses of major proportion. To give examples more recent than those cited in this monograph, it cannot have gone unnoticed to the principal shipping
powers of the world that the Panama Canal documents recently
concluded between the United States and Panama disregard
America's continuing legal obligations to Great Britain (and possibly to all Canal users) under the 1901 Hay-Pauncefote Treaty;
it has surely not gone unnoticed in Taiwan that America's
"acknowledgment" that Taiwan is part of China as far as Peking
is concerned makes it difficult for the United States to adJust its
policy should a true Taiwanese independence movement appear.
These seeming fumbles are not trivial, nor are they best described
in the language of game!:3. Such actions continued over time make
it, as a practical matter, impossible for Egypt or Israel to accept
American "guarantees" of a Middle East peace arrangement
without American money to build military bases poised against
each other. When we pay for such bases on both sides, not only
is the cost excessive, but the return in the form of increased
stability in the area may be illusory.
Before turning to the best means of recovering America~s
capacity to influence future events, it might be best to address
briefly some common misapprehensions regarding international
law. It is apparent from Professor Fisher's analysis that those
misapprehensions exist at the highest levels of government in the
United States and in the minds of many distinguished political
scientists.
It is apparent to Professor Fisher, as to most professionals in
the field, that the international legal order is not "primitive" or
crude in any way. It is a highly sophisticated legal system which,
like American constitutional law, relies for enforcement upon political pressures more than court action. A more precise analogy
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might be made to the British constitutional system. The British
constitution is not a single document; it is contained in many
documents of varying degrees of legal persuasiveness and in practices of varying antiquity. It is enforced by political pressures of
varying degrees of subtlety without policemen (although sometimes by armies). Treaties are not analogous to statutes except
in the same sense that ordinary contracts represent law for the
contracting parties. It is the legal order-the distribution of legal
powers and the full context of the system-that determines the
legal force of promises; and they are binding whether or not enforceable by courts, just as a purchaser's warranty will normally
be acknowledged by a respectable shop even though any particular customer is unlikely to bring suit when exchange of a shoddy
article is refused. The general international law regarding claims
has a close analogy to the common law of torts; like international
claims, the vast majority of potential tort actions are resolved in
this country with neither party seriously considering police or
court actions, but with both parties genuinely grappling with the
problems of any civilized society, in which competing interests
must compromise their desires at least for a while, to reach a
resolution with which all can live.
In order to operate effectively within the international legal
order, it is vital that it be perceived that there is such an order;
that legal powers are distributed within it not solely on the basis
of military or economic strength; that treaties are neither more
nor less binding than some underlying law determines them to be;
that rights of property are not "natural" but legal rights and are
limited in the international sphere in ways analogous to the ways
in which property rights are limited in all national law systems.
The need for that fundamental perception of system and its basic
tenets is routinely acknowledged within the Anglo-American legal
order when we require all law students to study constitutional
law, torts, contracts, and property. The need is no less for a practitioner within the international legal order and is most important when his client, whether a government or not, does not have
the legal insight himself.
This perception of system need not affect the lawyer's or
client's political. orientation. Just as there are "liberal" and
"conservative" private-law practitioners, there are able international lawyers in government, private practice, and academia at
all points of the political compass. Knowing the system does not
necessarily mean that an international lawyer will support any
particular legal policy-e.g., senatorial advice and consent to the
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various human rights conventions-any more than all private-law
practitioners will agree on any particular legislation or the desirability of a client's committing himself to any particular contract.
But knowing the system does mean that one's support or opposition is likely to be based on perceptions of short- and long-range
interest influenced by cases and writings that reflect distilled
experience and deep thought. And if all international lawyers
agree, surely that fact alone should be significant to those making
American policy, not only as a matter of common prudence, but also because many foreign international lawyers hold
positions of high influence in their own governments and their
perceptions of American actions directly affect their own governments' policies.
.
The ability to function as an international lawyer is not rare.
It is not often found among attorneys with no education or experience in international affairs, of course; it simply is not true that
any good lawyer will function well as an international lawyer, just
as it is not true that a good trial lawyer and a good municipalbond lawyer are necessarily cut from the same cloth. But many
law schools offer fundament'al courses in international law, and
a student's interest and some measure of ability (or, at least,
speed in picking up the basics) can be gathered from the records
of that experience. The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
alone graduates one or two appropriately trained lawyers each
year, both under a joint-degree program with Harvard Law
School and otherwise, and the reservoir of young talent is ample;
there are graduate schools and law schools all over this country
training young lawyers of equivalent caliber in equivalent skills.
Literally hundreds of qualified specialists in international law
represent foreign and multinational clients, participate in panels,
write articles, and join in the activities of the American Society
of International Law and other professional associations.
But as this is written, there is no one qualified in international law on the staff of either the House of Representatives
Committee on International Relations or the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations. The current Legal Adviser to the Department of State is only the second since at least 1907 to hold the
position of the United States' primary adviser on international
law with no known background in that subject, and the first to
show no interest in the American Society of International Law.
How can the Congress or the Legal Adviser, without training or
experience, judge whether a worthwhile contribution to policy
can be made by those with such training? Professor Fisher's anal-
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ysis and the studies that preceded it clearly reveal that they have
judged wrongly.
Nor is this situation the result of a sophisticated decision by
political scientists that there are better ways to perceive the international order than through laWYer's eyes. Amusingly, if not tragically, Professor Stanley Hoffmann of Harvard University, in the
most recent book on the subject, Primacy or World Order (1978),
seems to misconceive the international legal order, but derives
the same system through his own reasoning and perception as a
political scientist. And the evidence of Professor Fisher's monograph amply refutes any contention that American policy absent
a serious consideration of international law is as effective as it
would be if such consideration were given.
In this deplorable situation, what is to be done?
Professor Fisher proposes various steps to reorganize the handling of international legal problems within the United States
Government. Within the Department of State, he proposes the
appointment of "at least one deputy whose full-time job would
be . . . [to] make certain that actions dealing with day-to-day
crises took into account their impact on the international system"
(p. 39). This proposal seems to be both too much and too little.
Extra people are not needed because nobody with the job description of a lawyer-concerned-with-international-relations, even
with the most petty technician's tasks in the office of the Legal
Adviser, could do his job at a minimum competency level who did
not routinely consider the impact on the international system of
any proposal passing over his desk. There is no shortage of qualified young lawyers, and more experienced lawyers within the office of the Legal Adviser can easily shoulder the supervisory responsibilities for which they are paid, to assure the competency
of their immediate subordinates. To distinguish, as Professor
Fisher impliedly does, between the need for a senior lawyer to
perceive the international legal order and the supposedly lesser
need for junior laWYers and the Legal Adviser himself, is to degrade the functions of the Legal Adviser's office and to assume
that the Legal Adviser and his senior subordinates need not be
well grounded in the expertise that is the main function of their
jobs. The Legal Adviser is not the personal attorney of the Secretary; he is the head of an office in the bureaucracy charged with
supplying a kind of expertise that fits nowhere else in the government's organization. If the Secretary feels he needs a technician
in some other area of law, he can appoint a special assistant. But
the Secretary himself is not a mere individual; he is a government
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officer with public responsibilities. And his senior departmental
staff is not a personal staff; it is a staff of "Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and .Consuls" which, by article II, section 2,
clause 2, of the Constitution, cannot be appointed without the
advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. When an inappropriate or unqualified nominee is presented, it is the Senate's constitutional responsibility to give advice and withhold consent.
Professor Fisher's recommendation, therefore, ignores the constitutional responsibilities resting on the Senate and the highest
officers of our government. It is hard to see how his proposal can
ameliorate a problem of incompetence for which responsibility
rests with the President, the Secretary of State, and the Senate.
Professor Fisher's other proposals, all of which amount to
shifting out of the Department of State parts of the burden of
inserting the expertise of international lawyers into the government decision-making process, to the extent they are not themselves trivial seem to propose a cure that will not even alleviate
the symptoms of the disease. One example that seems to incorporate most of the weaknesses of all of them should suffice to raise
the issues:
In my view, the 'act of state' doctrine ought not to be applied
by the courts-or urged on them by the Executive Branch-to
preclude judicial consideration of issues susceptible of resolution
by reference to, for example, codified and customary principles of
public international law. [P. 85]

That very proposal was adopted by the Congress in the 1964
"Sabbatino Amendment" to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
as amended, 1 with regard to claims of title or other right to property based upon a confiscation or other taking after January 1,
1959, by an act of a foreign state. The result of that action by the
Congress has not been beneficial to the international legal order
or the United States constitutional order.
In 1964, Justice Harlan, speaking for an eight-to-one majority of the United States Supreme Court in Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino wrote: "There are few if any issues in international law today on which opinion seems to be so divided as the
limitations on a state's power to expropriate the property of aliens. . . ," and added: "We do not, of course, mean to say that
there is no international standard in this area; we conclude
only that the matter is not meet for adjudication by domestic
1. Pub. L. 88-633, pt. III, § 301(d)(4), 78 Stat. 1013 (current version codified at 22
U.S.C. §2370(e)(2) (1976)).
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tribunals." 2 The "act of state" doctrine was applied and the
Cuban nationalization was granted legal effect with regard to
property reaching the United States.
In reaction, the Congress enacted legislation providing that
"no court in the United States shall decline on the ground of the
federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving effect to the principles of international law" in such
confiscation cases and set out what it asserted to be the relevant
principles of international law, including one requiring "speedy
compensation for such property in convertible foreign exchange,
equivalent to the full value" of the property taken.
But, as the Supreme Court had pointed out, those
"principles" are not clearly principles of international law. In
fact, the principles of international law are in dispute and many
states disagree with the United States' negotiating position. It is
that negotiating position, a mere "autointerpretation," that is
now legislated as part of the United States' law; it is not necessarily a generally accepted formulation of international law.
And the legal power of the Congress to formulate negotiating
positions for the United States and require them to be enforced
as municipal law by American courts, while it has been upheld
as constitutional in the particular case, raises serious constitutional questions whose ultimate resolution is not at all clear. On
the face of it, the same constitutional considerations that inhibited the Supreme Court from adjudicating as a "domestic tribunal" on the matter should inhibit the Congress from legislating
on it or requiring an adjudication. It is the executive branch of
our government that speaks for the United States in international
forums where the rules of international law are hammered out;
that compromises claims and bears responsibility for formulating
the American legal argument when a foreign government complains of the inadequate compensation we have offered following
an American confiscation of foreign property here. Such cases
have happened before3 and may certainly happen again. In these
circumstances it is hard to see how the overruling of the act of
state doctrine in a Sabbatino situation allows anything more than
a rigid assertion of an argumentative American position by an
American court in a case in which a foreign government will
disagree as to the principles of international law that should gov2. 376 U.S. 398, 428 & n.26 (1964).
3. See, e.g., Norwegian Shipowners' Claims (Norway v. United States), 1 U.N. Rep.
Intl. Arb. Awards 307 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1922).
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ern the case. Such a situation may strengthen a negotiating position of a private American claimant in some cases, or even of the
executive branch in some claims negotiations, but at the cost of
the balanced give-and-take negotiation that is the basis for persuasive rule-formulation in the international legal order.
Moreover, the implications should be examined of the escape
valve the Congress left in the legislation when it provided that the
executive branch might require the court, in disregard of the rest
of the legislation, to apply the act of state doctrine when the
President determines that that application is required in a particular case by the foreign policy interests of tl].e United States. It
is hardly a justification for meddling with the constitutional distribution of responsibility within the federal government that the
individuals saddled with a responsibility can get it back when
they choose. If the President does nqt choose to make the appropriate determination, the Supreme Court would appear to have
no alternative but to hold the Sabbatino Amendment unconstitutional or to apply the Congress's version of the American position
on a question of international law, to the potential embarrassment of succeeding Presidents and the country as a whole. This
hardly seems the way to enhance respect for the -international
legal order in government decisions.
Moreover, the Supreme Court is in many cases no willing
recipient of responsibility with regard to international law. In a
recent decision construing the act of state doctrine in a foreign
confiscation situation, Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic
of Cuba, 4 the Supreme Court split four to four, with the one
"swing'' Justice expressing no opinion on the question whether
the "act of state" doctrine could bar a recovery. The fo~r dissenters invoked the Supreme Court's policy "of avoiding potential
interference with the executive channels through which our nation deals with others." 5 The dissenters apparently felt that the
executive's failure to act, and its willingness to pass the buck to
the Supreme Court, did not relieve it of the constitutional responsibility to resolve questions of international law by international
correspondence and action.
In these circumstances, it hardly oversimpli~ies Professor
Fisher's argument to say that it attempts to saddle an unwilling
and ill-equipped judiciary with a responsibility that constitutionally belongs to the executive branch, and that the latter's incom4. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
5. 425 U.S. at 737.
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prehension of international law is hardly remedied by attempts
to transfer its functions either to the Congress or to the judiciary.
The simple answer to the organizational problem is to staff the
executive branch so that it can fulfill its constitutional responsibilities, starting by replacing the technicians in the office of the
Legal Adviser of the Department of State-however competent as
technicians, as lawyers in fields other than international and constitutional law, or as political advisers-with competent international lawyers. That is the conclusion that flows from Professor
Fisher's analysis; his more moderate conclusions are not so moderate as they are short-sighted or inappropriate to the problem.
Professor Fisher has written a book summarizing a series of
studies on the importance of international law to rational and
perceptive decisions in international affairs. The book demonstrates its thesis in measured tones and with many examples. The
language of the exegesis, however, is taken from games theory and
applied too literally, thus trivializing the problem. Professor
Fisher's proposals to ameliorate the problem continue this trivialization and seem inappropriate. But the problem itself is so
clearly demonstrated and the truly ameliorative steps so obvious
that the competence of national leadership in the area of foreign
affairs can be measured by whether those steps are in fact taken.
If not, our national leadership will have a great deal to answer for
before the bar of history.

